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C. DWORK, D. PELEG, N. PIPPENGER, AND E. UPFAL faulty processors in a given system will grow with the size of the system, whereas the degree of the interconnection network by which the processors communicate will, for all practical purposes, remain fixed.
Despite these negative results, distributed systems are widely used and parallel computers are being built. This suggests that the correctness conditions for Byzantine agreement are too stringent to reflect practical situations. In particular, Byzantine agreement guarantees coordination among all correct processors, by necessarily omitting up to faulty processors. In many situations it may suffice to guarantee agreement among all but O(t) processors. In other situations a simple majority consensus may suffice. Similarly, in clock synchronization, or in firing squad synchronization, it may suffice for a vast majority of the correct processors to be synchronized.
In the traditional paradigm for distributed computing described above, the correctness conditions describe the states of all nonfaulty processors. In this paper we propose a new paradigm for fault-tolerant computing in which correctness conditions are relaxed by "giving up for lost" those correct processors whose communication paths to the remainder of the network are excessively corrupted by faulty processors. Such a processor is called poor. While any network of bounded degree must contain some poor processors, in this paper we show that their number can often be kept quite small, even in networks of constant degree. Further, we argue that this type of cooperation may fit well most applications of, say, Byzantine agreement. All known algorithms guarantee only that if at mostf-<_ < n / 3 processors fail then at least k -> n -f processors will mutually agree on a value. Our results show that we can eliminate the costly connectivity condition requiring f(nt) edges by employing an appropriately chosen bounded-degree network of n + O(t) processors and still guarantee agreement among n correct processors. Our paradigm admits deterministic solutions in networks of small constant degree to such fundamental problems as atomic broadcast, Byzantine agreement, and clock synchronization.
We present a general simulation technique by which for almost any regular graph G, the vertices (processors) of G can simulate an algorithm designed for a complete network in such a way that the number of poor processors in G is small. The crux of the simulation is a transmission scheme for simulating the point:to-point transmissions of the complete network by sending messages along several paths of G in such a way that there will always be a large set of correct processors capable of communicating among themselves as if they comprise a fully connected subnetwork, independent of the behavior of the faulty processors.
For consensus problems we can often do better than in the general simulation by employing a compression procedure based on the existence of compressor graphs [P] .
This procedure is iterative and local in nature, and cannot by itself guarantee agreement.
However, it can be used to "sharpen" dichotomies in that if a sufficiently large majority (e.g., all but O(t log t)) of the correct processors have the same value, then the procedure converges and strengthens this majority (e.g., to all but + 1).
Our model of computation is identical to that commonly used in the Byzantine literature. Specifically, each processor can be thought of as a (possibly infinite) state machine with special registers for communication with the outside world. The processors communicate by means of point-to-point links, which are assumed to be completely reliable. The entire system is synchronous, and can be thought of as controlled by a common clock. At each pulse of the common clock a processor may send a message on each of its incident communication links (possibly different messages on different links). Messages sent at one clock pulse are delivered before the next pulse.
For each of our transmission schemes there is a specific lower bound b on the number of clock pulses needed to simulate one complete round of message exchange More precisely, a protocol P is said to achieve t-resilient X agreement, where X is any term, if in every execution of P in which at most processors fail all but X of the correct processors eventually decide on a common value. Moreover, if all the correct processors share the same initial value then that must be the value chosen.
Note that the traditional Byzantine agreement problem is just 0 agreement.
A protocol solves a.e. agreement if it solves X agreement for some X such that X/(n-t)-O as n-*.
Our first result applies only to fail stop, omission, or authenticated Byzantine faults.
TIqEOREM 1. For all r>-5 there exists a constant e e(r) such that for all < en almost all r-regular graphs (i.e., all but a vanishingly small fraction of such graphs) admit a t-resilient algorithm for O(t) agreement.
The remaining results apply to unauthenticated Byzantine failures. THEOREM 2. For all r >-5, almost all r-regular graphs admit a t-resilient algorithm for O(t) agreement, where <-n 1-, for some constant e e(r), where e(r)-O as r-n.
The next theorems describe explicit graphs for which the set of poor processors is small. TIEOREM 3. The n node butterfly network (degree 4; see 2.3 for definition) admits a t-resilient O(t log t)-agreement algorithm for <-_ cn/log n for some constant c.
The result of Theorem 3 can be improved for a family of networks obtained by superimposing a compressor of degree 5 on a butterfly network. THEOREM 4. There exists a constant c and a network of degree 9 that admits a t-resilient O( t)-agreement algorithm for <-cn/log n.
In the case of unauthenticated Byzantine failures, we achieve O(t) agreement only for <= cn/log n. If > O(n/log n) then it is easy to show that the number of poor processors is linear in n. The existence problem for an O(t)-agreement algorithm in this case remains open. However, we solve this problem on graphs of unbounded but still relatively small degree.
THEOREM 5. For every 0 < e < 1 there exist a constant c c( e ), graphs G of degree 0 (n ), and t-resilient 0 t)-agreement algorithms for <= en.
Finally we present a purely combinatorial characterization of networks which admit p(t) agreement for any function p. When p(t) 0 our characterization coincides exactly with the (2t + 1)-connectivity requirement for the traditional Byzantine agreement cited above [D] .
2. Simulation results. In 2.1 we describe a general strategy for simulating on one network any algorithm designed for another network, describing what we mean by "simulation." In 2.2 we discuss a general scheme for implementing our strategy, and in 2.3 we make all of this more concrete by presenting the simulation of a complete network by a butterfly network. In 2.4 we show that our general scheme can be implemented on almost all regular graphs of bounded degree. Finally, 2.5 briefly discusses our results under more restrictive fault models. In order to use the transmission schemes described here the processors must have some knowledge of the topology of the system. The amount of knowledge needed, and how this quantity depends on the types of faults considered, are subjects for further research.
2.2. A class of transmission schemes. We now describe in more detail a specific class of transmission schemes, called three-phase transmission schemes. Let G be any network in which we may specify the following sets. For every node v we specify sets of processors Fin(/)), Font(V) _ . . V, each of fixed (but not necessarily constant) size s.
For each node w in Fin(V (Font(/))) a path from w to v (v to w) is specified. In addition, for each ordered pair of nodes (u, v) we specify s vertex-disjoint paths from Font (U) to Fin(/) The transmission of a message x from u to v consists of three phases. In the first phase the message is broadcast from u to every node in Fout(U through the specified paths. Thus, at the end of the first phase a copy of x is received by all nodes of Font(U).
(Those processors in 1-'out(U whose path from u contains faults may have received an incorrect version of the message, or nothing at all.) In the second phase the s (possibly corrupted) copies of u's message are sent along the vertex-disjoint paths from Fout(u) to I'in(V). In the third phase these (possibly corrupted) copies of u's message are routed to v along the specified paths from Fin(V) to V. Thus, v receives s (possibly corrupted) copies of u's message. Finally, v takes the value appearing in the majority of the copies that arrived to be the actual message. (If no majority exists then a default value is taken.) Clearly, v could be making a mistake, even if it is a correct processor.
Let T be some set of nodes on.the network (again, think of T as the set of faulty processors). A node u is said to be out-bad with respect to T if at least Proof. We will prove that for any T V, POOR (G, T)___ BAD (G, T). The claim then follows immediately from the definitions. Let T be some subset of V of size at most t. We will show that for any two processors u and v not in BAD (G, T), any message m sent from u to v according to the three-phase transmission scheme is correctly received by v. This follows from the following argument: since u is not out-bad, rn will reach at least of its first-phase destinations correctly. Thus at the end of the first phase, at most s/8 copies of m have been corrupted. In the second phase, since every copy is transmitted along disjoint paths, at most more copies might get hurt. Finally in the third phase, since v is not in-bad, at most an additional s/8 copies can be corrupted. Over all, at most s/4+ < s/2 copies of the message might be lost.
Therefore the majority of the copies will arrive intact, so v will recognize the message correctly.
Remark. It will sometimes be necessary to consider a more relaxed type of three-phase transmission scheme in which each node v (1-'out (U) [.J Fin(W)) may appear on at most two of the paths between these two sets (once as an endpoint and at most once more as an intermediate node). The paths have to remain otherwise disjoint. For such a scheme we can prove that if s is the size of the sets F, then for all < s/8,
2.3. Simulation of a complete network on the butterfly. In this section we show how to simulate a complete network on a simple degree-4 network known as the butterfly [U] . All we have to do is specify a transmission scheme. This is done losing at most O(t log t) processors in the presence of faults (i.e., at most O(t log t) processors will be bad as defined in 2.2).
An m-butterfly is a communication graph G,=(V,,,E,) with V,= {(a, i)lO<=a<=m-1, 0<_-i-<_2"-1}. The set of edges E, connects (a, i) to (b,j) if and only if b=(a+ 1)(mod m) and j is either identical to or differs from it in the ath least significant bit. On the butterfly we use a version of the three-phase scheme for transmitting a message from u =(a, i) to v=(b,j). To do this we need only specify the out-and 980 . DWORK, D. PELEG, N. PIPPENGER, AND E. UPFAL in-sets and the three sets of paths. All messages are sent only through forward links (i.e., from a node (c, k) to a node ((c+ 1)(mod m), l) but not in the other direction).
We take s=2" and define the sets F by Fin((C, k)) Fout((c, k)) {(c, 1)[0-< 1-<_2"-1}.
The paths are defined as follows. The forward edges of any node u span a full binary tree of height m whose leaves are all the nodes in ['out (U) , and the paths are chosen according to this tree. The second-phase paths connect every node (a, k) in Fout(u) to (b, k) in Fi,(v) by (b-a)(mod m) edges connecting every intermediate node (c, k) to ((c+l)(mod m),k). The third-phase paths from Fin(U to U are defined in a way similar to the first-phase paths, using the dual tree based on the backward edges. More specifically, the path from a node (c, k) is directed to its neighbor ((c+ 1)(mod m), l) with the cth bit of matching that ofj.
This completes the description of a three-phase transmission scheme for the butterfly network. We now analyze the resiliency of this scheme. CLAIM 2.3. b(Gm, t)= O(t log t).
Proof Let us measure the amount of "damage" that a faulty processor p can cause to correct senders in the first phase. Keeping p fixed and looking at all possible senders u whose paths to Fout(U) contain p we see that p can block at most 1/2 of the outbound paths for its 2 "distance i" neighbors. Summing up to distance log 16t, the total damage caused by faulty processors (measured in "number of dominated paths," or "number of destroyed copies") is ( 1) 21/2+41/4+. "+21g16'21og16-------S 2"= (log 16t)2".
The number of nodes that might lose 6 or more of their paths due to interruptions of distance log 16t or less is therefore bounded by log 16t(2"/(2m/16))= 16t log 16t.
NOW, let u be any processor for which less than 6 of the paths from u to ['out(U) contain a faulty processor at distance log 16t or less from u. We claim u cannot be out-bad. This would imply that the number of out-bad nodes is also bounded by 16t log 16t. To prove the claim, note that if less than 6 of u's out-bound paths are corrupted at distance log 16t or less, then even if we assume the existence of up to distinct faulty processes at distance log 16t or more from u, these faults damage at most t2m/2 lg6'= 2"/16 of the out-bound paths from u, so less than of the paths from u to Iout(U) are corrupted, and by definition u is not out-bad. The analysis for the in-bad nodes is identical. Thus, b(G", t)_-<32t log 16t. COROLLARY 2.4. p(G", t)= O(t log t).
Proof. The proof is immediate from Claims 2.2 and 2.3.
COROLLARY 2.5. For all m, there exists a t-resilient O( log t)-agreement algorithm running on G" for <-cn/log n for some constant c. Proof. The proof is immediate from Claims 2.1 and 3.1.
The next claim shows that this bound on almost-everywhere agreement is optimal for the butterfly network. CLAIM 2.6. p(G", t)= (t log t).
Proof Given t, let k [log t], and choose the faulty nodes to be {(i,j)[ i=0, k-1, j=0,... ,2k---l}. This choice completely disconnects the set of nodes {(a, b)la= 0, , k-1, b 0, , 2 k--1}, which is of size => log t, from the remainder of the network.
2.4. Almost all regular graphs have good transmission schemes. Let H(r, n) be the set of regular graphs of degree r and size n. Let h(r, n)= IH(r, n)l--> (n/r)"r/2 [Bo] . We will show that for almost every r-regular graph G, p(G, t) O(t / log t) for large FAULT Proof We turn the set H(r, n) into a probability space by giving every graph G H(r, n) the same probability. A proof that a random graph G H(r, n) possesses the properties (1) and (2) with probability at least 1-O(n -1) implies Lemma 2.7.
The study of the probability space H(r, n) presents a special difficulty since no explicit representation of the set H(r, n) or a direct procedure for constructing a random element in H(r, n) are available. Recently, Bollobis [Bo] derived a method for studying H(r, n) through a related, more simple probability space (r, n). Our proof is based on this new approach.
We start with a set,
.., n, i= 1,..., r}.
A configuration F is a partition of W into rn/2 pairs {(v, i), (v', i')}. Let (r, n) be the set of all configurations of W(r, n). A configuration F defines an r-degree multigraph (with possible self loops), with vertex set V {1,..., n} in which v is connected to v' if F includes a pair {(v, i) (v', i')} for some 1 _<-i, i'_ < r. Let (r, n) be the set of all configurations that define a proper r-regular graph.
Bollobis was able to show that [(r, n)l e(-r2-1)/4[c(r, n)l. Thus, if we turn (r, n) and (r, n) into probability spaces by giving all their elements equal probability, an event that holds with probability 1-O(n -) in (r, n) also holds with probability 1-O(n -1) in (r, n). Furthermore, each graph G H(r, n) is obtained from precisely (r!)" configurations. Thus, to prove that an event holds with probability 1-O(n -1) in H(r, n) it is enough to prove this result in the space (r, n), where the analysis is substantially easier.
We first obtain a lower bound for the number of edges with at least one endpoint in a given set of vertices U. Let/3 and a _-< e-Zr-4. Let For klog n, each of the terms in the sum is bounded by O(n-1/2); thus, the sum of the first log n terms is bounded by O(n-/3). For k -log n each term in the sum is bounded by (e(a+)ra(-)) k <= n -2
by the choice of a and . There are less than n terms in the sum; thus, Prob (E)= O(n-'/3). 
Again we distinguish between two cases. If k-< log n then since 2-/3--1/2, each term in the sum is bounded by O(n-1/2). If klog3 n then each term is bounded by (erra/2(ra)l/2)k, and thus, by the choice of a, is bounded by O(n-2).
Thus, the expansion property holds with probability Prob (/2)>= Prob (/[/1) Prob (/1) >--1 O(n-/3 D(u) denote the set of vertices in G at distance d +4 from u. By the expansion property, and the fact that r-3 >_-2, [D(u) [-> 16(r-3) d. We choose l-(U)-'-I-'in(U) rout(U to be an s=9(r-3) d <-tn element subset of D(u) . This leaves us free to use the same inbound paths as outbound paths. Specifically, we choose an arbitrary breadth-first search tree of G rooted at u, and use its branches to define paths between u and the elements of F(u). Finally, by the superconcentration property there are s "almost vertex disjoint" paths between F(v) and F(w) for every two nodes v, w of G. For each pair of nodes we specify a particular set of such paths. This completes the specification of the transmission scheme.
It remains to analyze the damage that can be caused by the faulty processors and to show that it cannot be too large. Let u be an arbitrary correct processor and let p be a faulty processor at distance from u. Then p can affect the paths from u to at most (r-1) d+4-i elements of F(u). At most r(r-1)
i-vertices u are at distance from p. Thus p can corrupt at most r(r-1) a+3 elements in sets F(u) for vertices u at distance from p. Summing up for all distances _-< d and all faulty processors we see that the faulty processors can corrupt at most tdr(r-1) d+3 paths in total. Therefore, assuming that this damage is distributed in a worst-case fashion for the transmission scheme (optimal for an adversary), b(G,t) <-log tr(r 1)d+3 9(r--3)d/8 8r(r-1) + log t.
Finally note that by the remark following Claim 2.2 and the fact that s/8 > (r 3) d >__ t, the same bound applies for p(G, t). Note also that this bound limits the results to O(n-) for an appropriate < e < 1. [3 COROLLARY 2.10. For every r>=5 almost every r-regular graph has a t-resilient O(t + log t)-agreement algorithm, for O(n-), for some 0< i < e < 1. [3 2.5. Results for faults of restricted severity. In this section we briefly mention our results for the failstop, omission, and authenticated Byzantine models. As with the unrestricted Byzantine failures (without authentication) our approach is to devise an appropriate transmission scheme. However, in the failure models considered here two correct processors can communicate provided they are connected by even one uncorrupted path. Thus the poor processors will be only those completely disconnected from the major portion of the graph. Now, if a graph has good expansion properties, then it is impossible for processors to disconnect more than O(t) processors. Combining this with the fact that almost all regular graphs of degree at least 5 enjoy such properties (Lemma 2.7), we obtain the following result. THEOREM 2.11. Assuming an authentication mechanism or nonmalicious faults (failstop, omission), for all r >= 5 there exists a constant c c(r) such that for all <-cn, degree networks. A different approach to reaching agreement in a bounded degree network can be based on distributed protocols of a local nature. In this section we consider such an approach and analyze its behavior on a compressor graph.
A graph G is a O-compressor for constant 0 < 1, if for every subset of vertices U of size UI <-On, the set {vlv has at least half of its neighbors in U} has cardinality at most UI/2. An explicit construction of compressors of a (very high) fixed degree (about 817) has been shown by Pippenger [P] . Using a recent result of Lubotzky, Phillips, and Sarnak [LPS] the degree of explicitly constructed compressors can be reduced to about 64.
Our interest in compressors follows from our ability to use the compression property to "sharpen" almost-everywhere agreement to achieve O(t) agreement (which is asymptotically optimal, as faults can always completely disconnect l)(t) correct processors). Ultimately, our approach will be to use one of the simulation techniques of the previous section to obtain p(G, t) agreement and then to sharpen this to O(t) agreement by using the compressor properties of the graph. We consider the following scheme for agreement, called the compression procedure. This procedure is based on simple rounds of the following form. In every round, every correct processor
(1) sends its value to all its neighbors, (2) receives the values of all its neighbors, and (3) chooses as its new value the value held by a majority of its neighbors.
The procedure terminates after some fixed number of rounds.
Let G V, E) be a 0-compressor of size n, and let T be the set of faulty processors in the network, ]T <=t <-On LEMMA 3.1. If there are (1-O)n correct processors which share the same initial value x, then after applying the compression procedure for log n rounds, at most + 1 correct processors will have a value different from x.
Proof Let Vk denote the set of correct processors whose value differs from v after k rounds of the majority procedure. Let Ak=((2k--1)t+]Vol)/2k, for k->0. We begin by bounding Ak in terms of n and t. Proof We prove the claim by induction on k. For k 0 the claim is trivial. Assume the claim for k inductively, and consider the case of k + 1. The set Vk/ will contain all correct processors whose majority of neighbors resides in T U Vk. By the inductive hypothesis this set has cardinality at most / Ak, which, by Claim 3.1.1, is at most On.
We may therefore apply the compression property to obtain Vk+l[ (t + Ak)/2 Ak+l.
Taking k log n we obtain Vk[ <--_ Ak =< + 1. This completes the proof of Claim Combining this with the transmission schemes described in 2.4, we prove the following.
COROLLARY 3.3. For every r > 5, h(r, n)(1 O(n-1)) of the h(r, n) r-regular graphs admit O(t) agreement, where O(n l-) for some 0< e < 1.
Proof By Lemmas 2.7 and 3.2 almost every r-regular graph enjoys the expansion, compression, and superconcentration properties. Let G be any such graph. Using the three-phase transmission scheme of 2.4 to simulate any standard Byzantine agreement designed for the complete network, we achieve O(t l/ log t) agreement, so at the end of the simulation at least 1-0 of the correct processors agree on a value. Since this satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.1 we may apply that lemma to obtain the desired O(t)-agreement.
COROLLARY 3.4. There exists a family of degree 9 networks that admit t-resilient O( t) agreement for <= an/log n, for some constant a.
Proof Since a butterfly has degree 4 and a compressor has degree 5, there exists a graph of degree 9 which is both a butterfly and a compressor. We first use the result of Corollary 2.5 to get an O(t log t) agreement on the butterfly graph, then we use the compressor to sharpen this agreement. [-I 4. Almost-everywhere agreement on networks of unbounded degree. On a complete network, t-resilient agreement protocols exist for all < n/3. In contrast, our previous algorithms can tolerate only O(n/log n) failures. The situation for higher values of on bounded degree networks remains open. In this section we present an approach for reaching agreement on networks of unbounded but small degree (which is nevertheless much lower than n or t). On top of that, we optionally add edges so as to make the graph into a 0-compressor. As discussed earlier, this property can be achieved by a graph of bounded degree.
Thus the degree of any node in the resulting graph will be O(nl/2).
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. DWORK, D. PELEG, N. PIPPENGER, AND E. UPFAL Let P be any t-resilient protocol for the traditional Byzantine agreement problem on a complete network [DFFLS] , [PSL] , [LSP] , guaranteeing agreement whenever the number of faulty processors is smaller than n/3. Proof Since all the good processors of A send the same message X, and t, t < m/4, the number of good processes in A receiving X is at more than m!2. Therefore after the majority step of COM, all the correct processes in A will have the same value X. By the unanimity property of the algorithm P, all the correct processors in Aj will eventually agree on X.
CLAIM 4.5. If < n/12 then in the end of the basic main algorithm (without the final compression step), agreement will be reached between most of the good processors; at most 3 good processors will reach a wrong decision.
Proof Denote the number of bad committees by b. Clearly b <-4t/m (otherwise, since every bad committee has at least m/4 faults, there are more than faults overall). Hence b<(4/m)(n/12)= m/3. Therefore the main algorithm will guarantee that all the good committees will reach agreement, where in every good committee all good processors will have the right value. The "confused" good processors are at most those in the bad committees, whose number is bounded by b(m-m/4)<-(3m/4)(4t/m)= 3t. [q CLAIM 4.6. If < On/4 then in the end of the algorithm (with the final compression step), agreement will be reached between most of the good processors; at most + 1 good processors will reach a wrong decision.
FAULT TOLERANCE IN NETWORKS OF BOUNDED DEGREE
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Proof Upon termination of the basic algorithm, the number of good processors holding a wrong value is bounded by 3 t, as shown in the previous claim. Thus < On/2, and l+ t<=4t < On, and by Claim 2.3, after the compression procedure at most + 1 good processors will have a wrong value. ] This algorithm can be naturally extended for graphs of degree O(n l/k) for k 3, 4,..., by dividing the graph into committees of committees of committees, etc., with an appropriate definition of a good committee on every level. We omit the details.
5. Combinatorial characterization of fault-tolerant networks. There is a necessary and sufficient condition for a system to be t-resilient in terms of the combinatorial properties of its communication graph. In this section we derive a combinatorial characterization of graphs that admit p(t) agreement.
For any agreement protocol P let P(T) be any maximal set of correct processors that always reach agreement under the protocol P, independent of the behavior of the processors in T (thought of as faulty). 
